Are Regional Development Commissions The New Deal?

Before and since Nigeria gained independence, the quest for balanced regional develop­ment has been a persistent challenge. The vast disparities between the country›s geopolitical zones, each with unique socio-economic needs, have fueled ongoing debates about the most effective development models. Over the decades, Nigeria has experimented with various strategies, yet the gaps remain, feeding a sense of marginalisation and underdevelopment in many regions. The need for tailored solutions to address these disparities is not just pressing, it›s a necessity. One prominent approach has been the establishment of Region­al Development Commissions (RDCs), agencies designed to address the pecu­liar challenges of each region. But as the number of these commissions con­tinues to grow, a fundamental question arises: Are Regional Development Com­missions the new deal Nigeria needs, or are they merely political tools serving the interests of an elite few?

The idea of regional development agencies in Nigeria is not new. It dates back to 1960 when the outgoing Brit­ish colonial government established the Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB). This initiative responded to the recommendations of Sir Henry Willink›s Commission Report of 1958, which identified the Niger Delta as a re­gion requiring special intervention due to its challenging terrain and historical neglect. The Willink Commission was a landmark in Nigeria›s pre-independence political history, tasked with investigat­ing the fears of minorities, particularly the ethnic groups in the Niger Delta, and proposing solutions to address their con­cerns. Its findings were clear: the Niger Delta faced unique environmental and developmental challenges that would re­quire special attention. Thus, the NDDB was born, intended as a special-purpose vehicle to drive development in the oil-rich but underdeveloped Niger Delta.

Godswill Akpabio, Senate President

However, despite its promising start, the NDDB failed to achieve its objectives. Seven years after its creation, it was dissolved without having made any significant impact. Historical records indicate that political interference, in­adequate funding, and a lack of clear strategic direction contributed to its failure. Moreover, the NDDB lacked the legal authority and institutional framework to implement large-scale projects, rendering it ineffective. This failure highlighted the complexities of centralised regional development and set the stage for decades of agitation for more effective solutions. From that period until now, demands for creating region-specific agencies have persisted, with each region clamouring for a de­velopment model tailored to its unique needs. This agitation was further fueled by the discovery of vast oil reserves in the Niger Delta, which, while contrib­uting significantly to national revenue, left the region impoverished and envi­ronmentally degraded.

The return to democratic gover­nance in 1999 rekindled hopes for a more equitable distribution of national wealth and balanced regional develop­ment. It was against this backdrop that the Niger Delta Development Commis­sion (NDDC) was established in 2000 to replace the defunct NDDB and its suc­cessor agencies. The NDDC was con­ceived as a bold solution to the peculiar development challenges of the Niger Delta, which had been plagued by en­vironmental degradation, poverty, and social unrest. With a clear mandate to drive sustainable development, alleviate poverty, and promote peace and security in the region, the NDDC was envisioned as a catalyst for positive change.

However, over two decades later, the NDDC has become synonymous with corruption, political interference, and mismanagement. Numerous audits and investigative reports have exposed how political elites siphoned funds for the region›s development. For example, a 2020 forensic audit revealed that over six trillion Naira allocated to the NDDC between 2001 and 2019 was largely mis­appropriated. The commission›s proj­ects were often abandoned or poorly executed, reflecting a pattern of waste and inefficiency. In 2021, the Nigerian Senate›s investigation into the NDDC›s activities uncovered 12,128 abandoned projects across the Niger Delta, raising serious questions about the commis­sion›s effectiveness and accountability.

The NDDC’s failure to deliver on its mandate has had far-reaching conse­quences. The Niger Delta remains un­derdeveloped, with high poverty rates, poor infrastructure, and widespread environmental degradation. Youth un­employment is rampant, contributing to social unrest and militancy in the region. The inability of the NDDC to address these issues has fueled public disillusionment and increased agitation for alternative development models. In 2020, protests erupted across the Niger Delta, with communities demanding ac­countability and transparency from the NDDC. These protests highlighted the growing frustration among the region’s inhabitants, who felt betrayed by an agency supposed to improve their lives.

The need for targeted regional interventions became even more pro­nounced in the aftermath of the Boko Haram insurgency in the North East. The insurgency, which began in 2009, devastated the region, displacing mil­lions and destroying infrastructure. In response, the North East Development Commission (NEDC) was established in 2017 to rebuild communities, resettle dis­placed people, and drive the region›s de­velopment. Its mandate included recon­structing schools, hospitals, and other public facilities, reviving the local econ­omy, and promoting peace and stability. However, despite its noble intentions, the NEDC has faced significant challenges. Security concerns have hindered project execution, while corruption and bureau­cratic inefficiency have undermined its impact.

In 2022, the Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP) report revealed that over 100 billion Naira allocated to the NEDC was un­accounted for, sparking public outrage and calls for greater transparency. Inves­tigations uncovered inflated contracts, ghost projects, and political patronage, leading to questions about the commis­sion’s commitment to its mandate. Addi­tionally, the NEDC’s projects have been criticised for being poorly targeted, with many communities most affected by the insurgency receiving little or no support. This has created a sense of neglect and abandonment, exacerbating regional social tensions.

In 2024, the quest for regional de­velopment took a new dimension with the establishment of three more RDCs: the North West Development Commis­sion (NWDC), the South East Devel­opment Commission (SEDC), and the South West Development Commission (SWDC). Additionally, plans are under­way to create the North Central Devel­opment Commission (NCDC) and the South-South Development Commission (SSDC). This unprecedented expansion of RDCs was driven by the belief that targeted, region-specific solutions are necessary for addressing Nigeria›s di­verse challenges. Proponents argue that these commissions represent a new deal for Nigeria›s regional growth, providing the framework for decentralised gover­nance and fostering regional collabora­tion, offering a ray of hope for the coun­try›s future.

Supporters of RDCs further argue that regional development agencies are necessary because different geopolitical zones face different challenges that re­quire targeted solutions. For example, the environmental degradation and oil pollution in the Niger Delta require a different approach than the rebuilding of communities devastated by insurgen­cy in the North East. The SEDC could promote industrialisation and entrepre­neurship in the South East, while the NEDC could prioritise educational reha­bilitation and security in the North East.

RDCs are also seen as a step towards regionalism and political restructuring, enabling greater autonomy and self-de­termination. By tailoring programmes and projects to leverage regional strengths, RDCs can stimulate econom­ic growth, foster collaboration among states, and enhance synergy with federal development agencies. Advocates argue that this decentralised model can bridge regional inequalities and promote na­tional unity by giving marginalised ar­eas a sense of inclusion and ownership.

However, the optimistic vision of RDCs as drivers of regional transfor­mation is not universally shared. Crit­ics argue that RDCs are often politically motivated, serving as elite channels to siphon public resources. They contend that these commissions are another layer of bureaucracy, adding adminis­trative costs without delivering tangible results. Corruption, patronage politics, and political interference are rampant, with RDCs frequently serving as tools for political manipulation and agents for funding the ruling party›s elections rather than vehicles for genuine devel­opment.

Another major criticism is that RDCs are plagued by a democratic deficit. Although they are perceived as regional initiatives, they often lack the power to make critical policy decisions. Instead, powerful political actors out­side the respective regions control de­cision-making processes, prioritising personal interests over regional needs. This undermines accountability and reduces public trust. Furthermore, the standardised template used for all RDCs, regardless of the unique challenges faced by each region, is counterproduc­tive. A one-size-fits-all approach fails to leverage the comparative advantages of each region.

The harsh reality is that RDCs have become centres of corruption that add little value to genuine development. They have evolved into extractive insti­tutions in the mould of what Economist Daron Acemoglu described as institu­tions created to enrich select members of the elite political class at the expense of the general populace. From the NDDC experience, intervention agencies can function as alternate states, duplicating projects for other government tiers, such as waste management and road construction. This results in resource wastage and project duplication. In many cases, RDCs engage in projects outside their mandate, straining already scarce public funds.

Fundamental reforms are neces­sary for RDCs to fulfil their promise as regional growth drivers. First, patron­age politics must be eradicated through stringent anti-corruption measures and enhanced transparency. RDCs should not serve as political slush funds but as accountable entities focused on real de­velopment. Second, strategic planning and effective project execution should replace poor planning and haphazard implementation. Development models should be context-specific, reflecting the unique challenges of each region rather than adopting a one-size-fits-all approach. Public accountability must be prioritised by involving local com­munities in decision-making, ensuring that projects reflect the people›s needs. Finally, robust monitoring and evalua­tion systems should be implemented to assess performance and impact.

Regional Development Commissions were conceived as catalysts for equitable development and regional prosperity in Nigeria. However, they have often fallen short due to corruption, inefficiency, and political manipulation. For RDCs to gen­uinely serve as engines of sustainable development, they must be adequately conceptualised, and we must prioritise transparency, accountability, and effec­tiveness. It is time to confront the failures of the past and reimagine RDCs as genu­ine vehicles for regional empowerment and national unity. Whether they rise to this challenge or remain tools of political patronage will determine the future of regional development in Nigeria.